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Few elements in the public view of science and medicine rival the romantic image of 
a scientist drinking a self-concocted potion and risking his or her life to benefit 
humanity. Recently, K.S. Brown (The Scientist, Dec. 11, 1995, page 1) outlined the 
history of self-experimentation in biomedical science. In but two paragraphs, 
however, was there any suggestion that, apart from being unconventional or 
potentially dangerous to researchers, self-experimentation as a methodological option might 
have weaknesses. Non-objective data analysis is the least of problems, 
however. 
 
Experimenting on oneself suffers from an extreme form of the observer's effect, when 
the observer becomes the observed. Self-observation is not only, as philosophers of 
science put it, "theory-laden," but also heavily introduced by the subject's mood and 
yesterday's diet. One might assert that self-experimentation represents only a minor 
current in research and as such poses little threat to the overall quality of biomedical 
science. However, self-experimentation is a special case of much more widespread 
research involving single subjects. 
 
Single-subject studies, such as a widely publicized attempt to use baboon bone 
marrow for AIDS treatment involving a single patient, named Jeff Getty (see story on 
page 3), represent a seriously flawed scientific methodology. Consequently, the 
results of all single-subject studies are bound to be erroneous. Do the errors matter? 
After all, every result obtained during the process of a scientific inquiry has an error 
attached to it, because the scientific procedure that generated this result may be biased or 
inaccurate. The imprecision and bias of our results may be evaluated only be statistical 
analysis of repeated observations. Without statistics, there is no way of 
knowing if the errors matter, and there can be no statistical analysis on samples of 
one. Can we then base our biomedical policies on estimates with unascertainable 
errors? 
 
The essence of empirical research is a constant tension between the Scylla of rejecting a 
correct explanation of a phenomenon and the Charybdis of accepting a false explanation. 
Science is about navigating between them and finding an explanation through separating 
unique from repeatable properties of subjects under study. Both types of properties are 
hopelessly confounded within any single individual, and no amount of technological progress 
will undo such confounding. The only way is through "averaging out" the superficial 
differences among individuals, to see what meaningful similarities remain (representing, for 
example, the effects of a medical treatment). 
 
Averaging out with single-subject experiments does not work; at best, with a proper 
experimental design one can demonstrate on one subject the presence or absence of some 
treatment effects. The critical proviso is "with a proper experimental design": 
lack of it is transparent in the Getty experiment. This ambitious trial was crippled by 
the absence of control subjects and by the placebo effect of unknown magnitude. Contrary to 
the claims of success, this particular experiment must be considered a 
failure, becoming victim of its own novelty and the politics surrounding the issue. The 
shortsightness of the Food and Drug Administration which permitted this singlesubject trial, 
rather than promoting larger, controlled experiments, is indeed baffling. The shortsightedness 
of some AIDS activists opposing fully controlled studies—those in which some subjects do 
not receive treatment--(L.K. Altman, New York Times, Feb. 6, 1996, page A1), on the 
grounds that they are unethical, is indeed tragic. 
 
Jeff Getty's uniqueness, resulting in part from the pre- and post-transplant treatment 
he received from his doctors (including radiation and a battery of antiviral, 
immunosuppressive, and other drugs) and the media spotlight, makes the failure of 
the transplant (L.K. Altman, New York Times, Feb. 9, 1996, page A14) 
uninterpretable. Even if the treatment did turn out to be harmless and efficacious, how far 
from optimal would it be for different people? What if Getty also had a rare 
metabolic error that, unbeknownst to him, influenced his response to the new 
treatment? Would the whole line of research be modified, leading us astray? Can 
therefore a single person represent all potential target patients? Of course not! 
 
Experimentation on single subjects (and self-experimentation in particular) violates 
basic assumptions of scientific inquiry and must be abandoned. It precludes statistical analysis 
and lets the dark forces of wishful thinking and preconceived notions creep into objective 
experimental methodology. With clinical medicine becoming more scientific (through 
awareness of inter-individual variability and need for statistical methodology, and so forth), it 
should have no place for single-subject 
experimentation. The progress in medicine requires well-designed trials that yield 
recommendations of optimal procedures, optimal drug dosages and optimal ways of 
administering them, leading to the maximization of the treatment efficacy. Although 
less romantic, Dr. Jekyll's self-imposed transformation or Jeff Getty's brave 
determination could have been much more informative had they involved appropriate 
experimental design. 
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